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The Change in and State of
Recent Economics
By John B. Davis
'Economics has a number of contemporary images: the theory of supply-and.
demand, Keynesian macroeconomics
and national aggregate demand management,
the science of self-interested behavior, rational choice theory, laissez faire and the idea that
markets should be free and unregulated, mathematical formalism, and even the Washington
Gonsensus on globalization.
In addition, there are many unhappy things
people perceive to be true about the economy
that they believe fairly or unfairly economics
have brought about: increasing competition
throughout life, threats to the viability of families and communities, job losses due to rising
imports, uncertain careers, financial market
instability, declining personal security, diserimination, and so on. There fewer things
people perceive about the economy in a positive way that they attribute to the influence of
economics, but sometimes they credit economics with ensuring near full employment,
maintaining economic growth, and making
globalization possible.
Economists themselves share some of these
opinions, but as insiders to economics, they
are far more cautious about the link between
economics and the economy. While a part of
economics is indeed about designing policies
based on economic theory, economists are
rather skeptical from a professional perspec-

tive about policy effectiveness. That is, they
recognize that policies can be changed in the
process of implementation, that they can have
unexpected consequences, and that they are
based on limited knowledge about the economy. Where hesitation seems to have been
lacking on the part of economists is in regard
to the confidence they have about the accuracy and reliability of economic theory. Yet this
now seems to be changing. This represents a
fairly new development in postwar economics, and some reasons why this change seems
to have come about will follow.
To begin, it helps to have some sense of the
development of economics as a professional
field. As a separate academic domain of investigation, economics was first established at
Cambridge University in the last decades of
the 19th century under the influence of Alfred
Marshall, with parallel developments occurring around the same time or shortly thereafter
in other industrializing countries. Of course
the investigation of economic life long preceded Marshall's efforts, but the academic
professionalization of economics served to recharacterize economics as a science and
exclude many who lacked the requisite standardized training from effective participation
in the discussion of economic issues.
A next important development for economics was the Great Depression, which led to a
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change in the public view of the prerogatives
and responsibilities of economics and economists vis-a.-vis the economy. The aggregate
demand management economics of John
Maynard Keynes-later called Keynesian
economics-was generally accepted by economists and the public by mid-century as being
successful in maintaining high levels of
employment and production, and economists
were thus expected to act on the policy front
when economies suffered, and seen as legitimately qualified to do so.
A third important development was World
War II and the postwar mathematization of
economics. The war created massive materiel
and personnel management problems that
required new quantitative tools. Economists
borrowed liberally from physics, engineering,
and operations research to develop these
tools, and then carried them forward in the
postwar to the analysis of markets and economic systems. The postwar period also saw
tremendous resources devoted to the development of university research faculties across
the sciences-partly driven by the Cold War.
This had the effect of multiplying the number
of professional economists with mathematical
training many times over, thus creating a large
identifiable academic-governmental constituency with generally high public approval
associated with the perceived performance of
economics in the Depression and the War.
Moving toward the present, our current
understanding of the world pivots on the fall
of ':he Berlin Wall in 1989. A change in the
status of economics seems to share this same
dat,~. One thing the Cold War did to economics (with the exception of the Vietnam period)
was drive out difference of opinion about its
subject matter. The technical assistance of
economists in the war effort promoted mathemadcal modeling in economics after the war,
which drove out more qualitative approaches,
plm diversity in general. Economics standardized itself around neoclassical theory and sys8

tematically cleaned house by denying paths to
professionalization to individuals interested in
non-standard and heterodox approaches to the
field. Minus the Wall, however, the standardization of economics seemed less compelling.
At the same time, dramatic change in the
world's economy associated with its increasing integration or globalization raised the
question of economics' flexibility and comprehensiveness. What then has happened,
then, to economics in the last quarter century?
Recent economics can be described as a
traditional neoclassical core surrounded by
two sets of approaches that challenge it: (a)
heterodox research programs (many of them
long-standing, others more recent) that have
survived the standardization process, and (b) a
collection of new research programs which
largely derive from the influence of other sciences on economics. The former include institutional economics, Marxist economics, radical political economy, social economics, feminist economics, Post-Keynesian economics,
and neo-Austrian economics. The latter
include behavioral economics, game theory
(in various forms), experimental economics,
evolutionary economics, and complexity economics.
Neoclassical economists generally ignore
both sets of approaches but are increasingly
aware that the standard view of economics is
under challenge from many directions. There
is also criticism of economics by those who
consider themselves neoclassical, led by a
number of leading economists who are either
dispositionally open to change in economics
or who have their own complaints against
neoclassicism. Thus the old confidence economists exhibited in the first two or three
decades after the war about the state of economic theory now seems to be somewhat
weakened. This is not to say that econo~ists
who follow standard theory anticipate its
demise. Rather it is more a matter of an
increasing concern that the challenges to the
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standard approach in many instances go
directly to its heart ... and may be right. Let
me identify some of these challenges, as well
as those who are responsible for them.
Most important of all is the critique of
rationality and rational choice. Neoclassical
economics has come to be seen by many as
the theory of rational choice, whereby individuals make optimal choices for themselves
based on the prices they face and their personal preferences. Other people's desires and the
different circumstances in which choices are
made are said to not influence the individual's
decision. Prices create clear incentives for
self-regarding individuals, and individual
behavior maximizes individual utility, or
makes the individual as well off as possible.
That individuals choose rationally is also the
foundation of the claim that markets work
efficiently, that is, that left to operate freely
they make everyone better off (putting aside a
small number of cases generally agreed to
represent exceptions).
But there is now considerable empirical
evidence from psychology that individuals do
not choose rationally. Economists have historically assumed that individuals choose rationally and marshall a variety of thought experiments to motivate this assumption. But psychologists since the 1970s, in an empirical
subfield called behavioral decision research,
have run actual experiments that consistently
demonstrate that individuals do not behave
rationally. In particular they show that individual decision-making is reference-dependent, meaning that the circumstances in which
people make choices have anchoring effects
on those choices. Thus how a question is
posed influences the choice a person makes.
Moreover, people seem to be rather poor at
making certain kinds of choices in which considerable information processing is required,
especially with respect to estimating probabilities as are associated with choices concerning
future events. What psychologists have conse-

quently argued is that people use a variety of
cognitive devices to help them frame their
decisions. This has been articulated as the
heuristics and biases program, associated with
the influential research of Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky, and now an active field in
economics called behavioral economics.
Economists have not been able to avoid
becoming acquainted with this research, since
Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 2002, despite not being an
economist. (Tversky would likely have shared
the Prize but was deceased.)
Thus a key foundation of neoclassical economics, rational choice, has been strongly
challenged. Further, it has been challenged not
simply as a scientific tenet, but also at the
level of its methodological foundations. John
Stuart Mill, a half century before Alfred
Marshall, argued that economics is primarily a
deductive science or a special kind of logic.
Unti'! the rise of econometrics after World War
II, economics' credentials as an empirical science have been thin at best, while econometrics-the statistical analysis of equations representing economic relationships-has never
really tested the economic behavior underlying those relationships. Thus it was something
of a shock to the economics profession when
Kahneman and Tversky and their colleagues
not only demonstrated that one empirically
could test individual choice behavior, but that
the experiments in which this was done could
be extensively replicated. Economists had
always argued that experiments could not be
done in economics on the grounds that one
could not isolate and scientifically control a
piece of the economy and run experiments on
it. But the psychologists had a long tradition
of isolating individuals in laboratories and
testing their behavior. For them it was a minor
development of their science; for economics it
was a significant development, and, moreover, one disruptive of long-established thinkmg.
9
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A second key challenge to neoclassical economics was to the concept of equilibrium. The
idea of an equilibrium state is the idea of the
economy, or a part of it, settling into a condition in which there are no forces acting to produce change. It is also the idea that the economy tends to settle to natural resting places in
which the different plans and behavior of
countless different individuals is harmonized.
The classic example is the balance of supply
and demand. As a price rises, supply rises and
demand falls; as a price falls, demand rises
and supply falls. Economists argue that prices
will fluctuate until the amount demanders
want is exactly equal to the amount suppliers
offer, and the market clears. The doctrine
underlies the laissez faire prescription economists see as their default policy position and is
the basis for the idea that economists generally favor free trade in markets.
The situation with the equilibrium concept
in economics is a little more complicated than
the situation with the rationality concept. A set
of very technical results in the 1970s in the
theory of the economy as a general equilibrium of markets-known as the SonnenscheinMantel-Debreu results-demonstrated that
two of the main properties universally agreed
to be part of the concept of an equilibrium,
namely, that it is unique and stable, were
impossible on the standard foundations. By
most accounts, this led to economics' general
abandonment of the notion that the economy
could be represented as one large general
equilibrium of markets, and the substitution of
an tmtirely new approach developed in mathematics called game theory.
Game theory was created explicitly for economics in the 1940s by John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgen-stern. So in trouble on a
foundational concept, economics turned to
mathematicians. Indeed they soon substituted
a new concept of equilibrium for use in game
theory that came from another mathematician,
John Nash (also later a Nobel Prize winner in
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economics). Unfortunately, it was soon determined that equilibrium in this new game theory framework suffered one of the same failures as general equilibrium theory: it could
not be shown to be unique. Thus economics
found itself with the idea of the economy settling to some equilibrium state of affairs but
could not determine which state of affairs it
was!
In the economics of the last quarter century, then, two new initiatives have come forward as proposals regarding how this situation might be sorted out. Again, both come
from outside of economics, one from evolutionary biology and the other from physics.
Evolutionary biology came into economics
when a small group of economists remodeled
games as contests between different types of
players in evolutionary settings. The population frequencies of these different types of
players were considered equilibrium outcomes, and these outcomes could be shown to
have a number of desirable, expected properties associated with eqUilibria. However, since
the players in these evolutionary games were
now types of individuals---or species in effect
-the price at which this re-elaboration of the
equilibrium concept was achieved was the
removal of particular individuals from economic analysis. In evolution, individuals do
not survive; species do. It may well be of
course that economics in the long run is about
the survival of kinds of economic agents
rather than about individuals as economic
agents. But this means it has little to tell us
about ordinary day-to-day decision-making in
economies in the short run. Presumably most
people expect economics to have something
to say about this too.
Physics (or rather physics, a number of
other physical sciences, some of the computational sciences, and a number of other fields)
has also had an impact on thinking about equilibrium in recent economics in influencing
economists to think about the economy as a
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complex adaptive system. In general, the
emergence of complexity theory in recent
years is due to advances in computing power
that have made it possible to simulate large
complex systems of different relationships
with multiple confounding feedback patterns
that cannot be solved with traditional analytical methods. Simulations run over many periods and may exhibit phase transitions and
emergence in which formerly undetectable
aggregate phenomena suddenly become maniH~st.

In economics, complexity thinking begins
with the idea of collections of heterogeneous
individuals or agents who directly interact
with one another. An important subject of
investigation is network effects, or how conc1entrations of interrelated individuals display
shared characteristics that have varying
impacts on their individual behavior. Many of
these new models are quite interesting, but
they often have some very untraditional
results for standard economics. One is that
equilibria may either not exist or be transitory.
An economy may move through a number of
only temporary resting points that are unstable. Thus economics' long attachment to the
equilibrium concept may ultimately go by the
wayside.
This also has implications for that standard
concept of the individual. If the economy
never really settles into one state or another, it
may not make sense to say that individuals
ever maximize anything. They might rather be
seen as continually sorting through a variety
of different strategies as appropriate to the
changing circumstances they encounter, never
a.::hieving anything that might be termed a
best state of affairs.
Thus both rationality and equilibrium,
mainstays of postwar standard neoclassical
economics, have an uncertain future in econDmics. This is not to predict that economics
will undergo significant change in the future
or that these concepts will disappear. But they

no longer have the same unchallenged position in the field they had in the three decades
after the War. We might say, then, that economics is becoming more pluralistic, and per-

There is now an entire field of investigation in economics called experimental economics.
haps more decentralized with a larger number
of research strategies being pursued, not all
neatly covered by one large umbrella view of
economics. In addition to the developments
discussed above, five more deserve mention,
three of which were also associated with individuals awarded Nobel Prizes in Economics.
First, there is now an entire field of investigation in economics called experimental economics. Having long denied experiments
could be carried out in economics, now a significant number of researchers in the field are
carrying them out. Many deny that individuals
must always be seen as rational. For example,
Vernon Smith (also an Economics Nobelist in
2002) allows that individuals may act for a
variety of reasons, but sees the market process
as ultimately driving individuals to efficient
market behavior. He thus decouples the standard neoclassical view that rationality and
efficient markets in equilibrium go hand in
hand, in order to preserve the idea that markets tend to produce efficient equilibrium outcomes. Further, his conclusions are the result
of numerous market experiments run by him
and his colleagues. Whereas economists previously argued in deductive fashion that markets settle to equilibrium, Smith succeeded in
showing this to be an empirical result.
Second, as the 2007 Nobel Prize shows,
there is an active new field in economics
called market design. Market design economics investigates the institutional structure and
pricing mechanisms of efficient markets and
then develops strategies for reforming exist11
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ing markets that are inefficient and creating
markets that would be efficient where they do
nOl: exist. An example of reforming an inefficient market is the design of applicant-vacancy matching algorithms or procedures for
medical residents. An example of a created
market was the design of auctions for the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission granting of access rights to the electromagnetic
wa ve length spectrum.
One remarkable thing about market design
economics is that it abandons the traditional
assumption in economics that markets are naturally competitive and should be left free and
umegulated. In market design economics, in
contrast, the idea is that markets often need to
be constructed in order to work freely.
AnJther thing that is interesting about market
design economics is its recourse to experimental research in the laboratory. Possible
institutional arrangements for markets are
first tested in the lab before being tried in the
real. world, so again deductive investigation is
not enough.
A third new area of investigation in economics is neuroeconomics. Neuroeconomists
use brain-scanning techniques from neuroscit:::nce to investigate how the mind functions
when individuals engage in economic behavior in laboratory situations. For example, in
some experiments, individuals play a game
involving bargaining, and researchers then
examine their brain activity to determine
which centers of the brain are active. The
standard view is that decision making
involves the prefrontal cortex or the "thinking" part of the brain. But there is considerable' evidence showing that areas of the brain
associated with emotional response, or affect,
play important roles when individuals find
themselves in bargaining situations. This raises general questions about human ability in
decision making. If people do not always
make decisions rationally, they may not make
always make decisions that are in their best
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interest, as for example when they decide how
much to contribute to voluntary pension savings plans. There may then be an argument for
public policy initiatives that set default
options for such programs that would be in
individuals' best interests.
A fourth new development in economics is
capabilities research, inspired by the work of
Amartya Sen, also a Nobel Prize winner in
economics. Capabilities are freedoms to exercise various capacities or functionings we
have. Thinking of individuals in these terms is
a departure from the standard view that individuals are utility maximizers, where this is
usually understood in terms of preference fulfillment. Preferences are always given on the
standard view, but the exercise of capabilities
involves the development of individual capacities or functionings. This leads to an entirely
ditferent view of individual well-being and
has resulted in the construction of a number of
new types of indices to measure progress in
developing individual capabilities. For example, the United Nations Human Development
Programme uses the Human Development
Index to determine different countries'
progress in promoting the achievement of
higher levels of basic human capabilities. This
has important implications for public policy
in developing countries and indeed for policy
in developed countries as well. The capabilities concept's adoption by economists was
largely inspired by philosophical influences
on economics.
Fifth, a new view of the concept of individual preference is called the social preferences
approach. Much experimental work in economics investigates individual behavior in
game theory settings. The standard neoclassical prediction is that people would generally
act in a self-regarding way in these experiments. But one result of game theory experiments is that people are also motivated by
social preferences-altruism, fairness, and
reciprocity-and that these motives may
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dominate self-interest. The most famous
experiment is the ultimatum game in which
one player is given a sum of money and may
decide to give some of it ~o a second player. If
the second player accepts, the distribution is
made, but if the second rejects the offer, neither get anything. Self-interest predicts that
"(he first player offers the smallest possible
amount, and the second player accepts this.
But the evidence consistently shows that largI!r amounts are offered, and very small
amounts are rejected. Thus people have social
preferences, or preferences concerning their
relations to others, and the traditional Homo
economicus view of the individual seems limited in what it can explain.
Thus, despite the fact that economics is still
largely identified with standard neoclassical
economics, there is considerable change in the
field, particularly on the research frontier.
Much of this change, moreover, is inspired by
influences of other sciences on economics.
Sciences, of course, are distinguished by their
Hubject matters, but they also typically have
different practices of investigation and
methodologies of explanation. Thus as new
concepts and ideas come into economics from
other fields, they often import along with
them new ways of conceptualizing investigation in economics. Game theory and experimentalism are two prime examples of this.
Neither methodology existed in economics
until the postwar period, and together they
have created a range of new strategies for
explaining markets and economic behavior.
From the point of view of non-economists, no
doubt many of these kinds of changes appear
t~soteric and unrelated to everyday concerns
regarding the functioning of markets and
tmtire economies. Moreover, societies seem
most concerned with economics as regards
t!conomists' policy recommendations. Policy
targets changes in the ways economies work,
but it need not be accompanied by theoretical
explanation. Debates over economic policy

concern impact, and rarely do non-economists
debate impact in terms of theoretical distinctions. That they leave to the economists, so
that change in the foundations of economic
policy generally occurs, as it were, behind the
scenes.
In addition, economics as a science is in an
unusual position with respect to the nature of
its policy prescriptions as compared to many
other sciences. A science's policies can be
looked at in two ways: how great their impact
is, and how precisely they are able to target
their object. For economics, impact is often
high since many people's lives can be affected by economic policies in significant degree.
But, as noted at the outset here, economists
are aware that economic policy may not
achieve its objectives, because policies can be
changed in the process of implementation,
they can have unexpected consequences, and
they are based on limited knowledge about the
economy. Thus the general situation for economics is that things can go wrong, and sometimes in a serious way. This by itself is enough
to make economists cautious about the claims
of economics in explaining the economy. But
the change in recent economics has added
another reason for caution. No longer does it
seem that economics as a science is complete
and mature, as many believed in the first three
decades after World War II. Now it is increasingly recognized that there is on-going
change, debate, and key theoretical challenges
afoot, reducing confidence regarding how
secure economic theory should be thought to
be. Perhaps the response to this will be to keep
debates in-house. Then, should a new consensus emerge in the future about the nature of
economic science, economics may re-appear
as a unified science. •

13

